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Abstract 
The competitive solution and the uniform competitive solution are different solution 
concepts for cooperative games. The first was introduced by McKelvey, Ordeshook and 
Winer (1978), the second is proposed in the present paper, however, it is deriving from 
the same original ideas. 
A (uniform) competitive solution is a finite configuration of effective payoff vectors,
each of them being associate to a coalition. This configuration satisfies two fundamen­
tal requirements: the internal stability and the external stability. Despite the existing 
differences. the competitive solutions and the uniform competitive solutions have some 
common properties and are also r<'latf'd to some other classical solution-concepts. 
The uniform competitive solution is a modified version of the competitive solution. 
Sonw disadvantages of the earlier concPpl <U<' n•movcd and the existence theorems for very
large classes of both transferable utility a11d non-transferable utility games are provided. 
COMPETITIVE SOLUTIONS AND UNIFORM 
COMPETITIVE 
SOLUTIONS FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES * 
Anton Stefanescu 
1 Introduction
The competitive solution was proposed by McKelvey, Ordeshook and Winer [3] as an
alternative to classical solution concepts for cooperative games, to explain better some 
situations in political science. For a more complete motivation behind this concept we 
refer to [3], [4] and [5]. 
Although some properties of the competitive solution were shown, general existence 
results are missing, except for those situations when the competitive solution are related 
to other solution concepts (core and stable sets). However, the examples analyzed in the 
above cited papers. would suggest that the existence of competitive solutions may be 
extended to larger classes of games. C'SpPcially to the simple games which are important 
in the modeled political phenomena. 
We begin our study in sectiou 2 by dt'1i!1111g thrC'C' solution concepts deriving from 
the same common idea: the com pC'titiv(• solution. tlw strong competitive solution (both
iutroduc<'d in !3)) and thC' uniform rnmp«'t it l\'P solution. We discuss their common prop­
erties and WC' clarify the re lationsh ip a111011g tlH'111. pointing out the existing differences. 
Section 3 presents some special propert ie:-. of these concepts for the transferable utility
(TU) cooperative games. Section 4 provides existence theorems for a complete uniform 
competitive solution for different standard models of TU games. The method of proof 
of the main theorem allow us to rediscover Shapley's theorem for the core of convex 
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1 
games as a particular case of the existence of a uniform competitive solution. The last 
section presents the existence theorem of the uniform competitive solution for the non­
transferable utility (NTU) case. It is also proved that simple games admit such solutions.
2 Competitive Solutions 
First, we wlll explain the notation used in the paper. Everywhere in this paper, N is 
the (finite) set of players: N = {l, 2, ... , n} and 2N is the set of coalitions, i.e., the set
of all subsets of N. If C � N, C =/:- fJ then I C I stands for the cardinality of C and the 
notation Re will be used instead of RICI. If x E RN we write x( C) for the sum L:kec xk
of the components indexed in C, and we will use both the symbols xc and prcx for the
vector (xk)kec, formed by the components of x indexed in C. Also, for any subset A of
RN an.d for any coalition C we define prcA = {xc I x  EA}.
If x, y are in Re, we write x � y if xk 2:: yk for all k EC: we write x 2:: y if x 2:: y but
x =/:- y and we write x > y if xk > yk for all k. Some ambiguities may appear when I C I 
can be 1. In this case, x 2:: y must be interpreted as x > y, but we will always keep the
usual meaning of the relation 2:: when we refer to scalars.
The usual representation of a general cooperative game in characteristic function form 
is a pair (N, v), where v, the characteristic function, is defined on 2N and assigns to each
nonempty coalition C a  subset of Re. Note that for simple games v(C) may be empty
even when C =/:- fJ .  As usual we interpret an element of v( C) as a payoff vector which 
the coalition C can guarantee for its members even if the players not in C disagree with 
him. An x belonging to v(N) represents an n-payoff vector which may be achieved by 
all players at the end of a possible play . Consequently, x E v(N), or more general, 
x E prcv( N). when x E Re ,is rall£>d t.lw effcctfoeness condition.
Now we are ready to define th<> solutiou couc£>pts. Let (N, v) be a cooperative game
in the characteristic function form. 
Definition 1. The pair (x. C) is a proposal if C C 2N, C -::/= fJ, x E v(C) and x E
pr c l'( .\' ) . 
Now. let K = {(y1, C,): 1 = 1. :!, . . .. 111} b1• a fiuitP set of proposals.
Definition 2. K is a competitive solution (c.s.) if:
(1) l . . 1 l c,nc1 c,nc, t iere arc no Z,J sue l t mt y, > y1 
(2) if (x, C) is a proposal and xcnc, > yfnc, for some i, then there exists j E {1, 2, ... , m}
such that ufnc, > xcnc, 
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Definition 3. JC is a strong competitive solution (s.c.s.) if it satisfies (2), (3) and (4)
where, 
enc· C·nC· ( 4) there are no i, j such that Yi ; � Yi ' ; Of course, a s.c.s. is a c.s. too.
Definition 4. JC is an uniform competitive solution (u.c.s) if
(5) enc; c,nc; £ . . {l 2 }Yi = Yj or every i,J E , , ... , m 
(6) if (x, C) is a proposal and xcnc; � yfnC; for some i, then there exist j and k E cncj
such that yj > xk.
It follows from these definitions that a c.s. (s.c.s. or u.c.s.) is a configuration of pro­
posals which is stable against the objections coming from outside and is also characterized 
by an internal stability condition. An important difference between the bargaining set 
of the Aumann-Maschler theory and the competitive solutions arises from the fact that 
the coalitions in the configurations are not necessarily disjoint. Consequently, a c.s. may 
only predict payoffs for a set of coalitions which seems to be profitable for the potential 
partners. The stability is expressed in terms of a counter objection against any objec­
t�on. Related to this point, the concept of u.c.s. is intended to remove some ambiguities 
existing in the previous two solution concepts, respectively, c.s. and s.c.s. The situation 
illustrated in figure 1 is also emphasized in Example 2. Suppose that the proposal (x, C)
is an objection against JC. This means that some players support this objection since x 
will improve their output. In all three definitions the supporting players are the pivotal 
players in C n C. A counter objection must be claimed by the players which would lose if
the objection is accepted. But according to the definitions of c.s. and s.c.s. these players 
might be the same as the supporting players . i.e. c n c, = c n cj. In that situation one
or more players may have two rnntradictory positions against the objection (x, C).
Condit ion ( 5) of tlw definition of u .r .s. 111ak<·s im possible this situation. Consequently,
any play<•r must have one and only ow· pos1t1011 toward a given objection: he may support 
it. he may r<'j<•ct it or. h(' is indiffrrmt. 
D<•spitP tll<' Pxistiug diffrre11<·<·s. c.s . . s.r.s. and 11.c.s. have some remarkable common 
prop<·rt iPs. 
Proposition 1. If IC is a c.s. (s.c.s. or u.c.s.) and (y, C) E IC, then y is weak Pareto
optimum in t•(C) n PTcv(N).
Proof: To the contrary, let be x E v(C) n prcv (N) such that x > y. Then, there
exists (u, D) E IC such that ucnv > xcnv (uk > xk for some k E C n D, if JC is u.c.s.).
Hence, ucnv > ycnD(uk > yk) contradicting (1) (respectively, (5) ). 
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The following two propositions invoke the definition of the core of a cooperative game. 
The core of the game (N, v) is the set C(N, v) = { u E v(N)I there is no C � N, C #/J 
and x E v(C) nprcv(N) such that x > uc} .
The existence of a s.c.s. when C(N, v) #/J was been established in [3]. The same
conclusion holds for u.c.s. A converse implication may be easily shown if the game admits 
a special type of s.c.s. (or u.c.s.) 
Proposition 2. If C(N,v) #/J, then, for every u E C(N,v), the set JC =  {(u,N)} is a
s.c.s. and u.c.s. 
Proposition 3. If IC = {(u,N)} is a c.s. (respectively, u.c.s.) then u E C(N,v).
Particularly, C(N.v) -::f./J. 
Proof: Indeed, if u <t. C(N, v) then there exists a proposal (x,C) such that x > uc.
But , the last inequality is equivalent with xcnN > uCnN, which is impossible since
{ ( u, :\')} is a c .s. (respect ively . 11.c.s. ). As a consequence of the last two proposition we
have: 
C(X. r·) = {y:{iy . .\')}is a c.s. (u .c.s.)}
Tht• relationship betwPeu c.s. aud :-.t abl1· �t>ts wa .. -; discussed in [3]. Now, two additional
properties of u.c.s. can be stat<'d. 
Proposition 4. Let be (y, C) E IC and K a u.c.s. Then, y is Pareto optimal in v(C) n
pr c l'( .\' ) .
Proof: Suppose x E v(C)nprcv(N),x � y. By (6), there exists (u,D) E IC and
k E C n D such that uk > xk. Since xk � yk this implies uk > yk, contradicting (5) of
Definition 4.
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Proposition 5. Let k EN. Suppose zk = sup(v({k}) n prkv(N)) < oo. If/( is a u.c.s.
and k E C for some (y, C) E /(, then yk ;:::: zk. 
Proof: To the contrary, let x E v({k})nprkv(N), xk > yk. Then, there exist (u,D) EJ( with k ED such that uk > xk, i.e. uk > yk. Contradiction.
The next examples will clarify the relationship between c.s. and u.c.s. Also it will 
be shown that the Propositions 4 and 5 fail if /( is c.s. (s.c.s. ). At the same time, 
examples 1 and 4 illustrate some aspects of the competitive solutions which lead us to 
formulate additional requirements. 
Example 1. n = 3.v({i}) = [0, 1], i = 1, 2, 3;v({i, j}) ={(xi, xi) E R!lxi+xi::::; 2} for
every pair (i, j), i < j and v({l, 2, 3}) = {(x1,x2,x3) E R!lx1 +x2 +x3::::; 3}. It is easy
to recognize an additive TU game. Consequently, the core is nonempty consisting in one 
point. C(N, v) = { u }, where u = (1, 1, 1). 
From Proposition 2 it follows that /(1 = { ( u, N)} is s.c.s. and u.c.s. Let us list some 
other sets of proposals: 
/(2 = { (1, {1} ), (1, {2} ), (1, {3})} 
. /(3 ={((1, 1), {1, 2} ), ((1, 1), {1, 3} ), ((1, 1), {2, 3})} 
J(,4 =J(lu1(2,
J(,6 = IC3 u J(,4. 
IC2• IC4• IC5 and IC6 as well a.<> IC1 arc s.c.s. and u.c.s. too. But IC3 is a u.c.s. which is 
not c.s. To see this. consider the proposal (x. I\'). where x = (1.5, 1.5, 0). It is easy to see 
that (x, /V) is an objection against the proposal (u, { 1, 2}) E IC but there doesn't exist a
counter objC'ction in the sense of D1•finit io11 2. 
On thC' other hand. in this exa.mpll' th<• S<'t of competitive solutions may be (partially) 
orden•d by tlw set-inclusion n•lat ion. Cm1s<•q11rnt ly �ome c.s . could be minimal or maxi­
mal iu r<'SJH'ct with this order. 111 pri11cipl<1• it is pa.-;y to obtain a minimal c.s. (or u.c.s.) 
if at lea.st one is available. But is not always clear how can be recognized the maximality. 
However. we shall show, at the end of the present section, that this is possible for the 
u.c.s. 
Example 2. n = 3.v({l}) = [O, 1.lj, v({2} ) = [O, l], v({3}) = {O}, v({l, 2}) = {(x1,x2) E
R!lx1 +x2::::; 3}, v({i,j}) = {(x',xJ) E R!lx1 +xi::::; 1}, if (i,j) # (1,2),
v({l,2,3}) = {(x1,x2,x3) E R!lx1 +x2 +x3 � 3}
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K, = {((1,2),{1,2}),((2,1,0),N)} is a s.c.s. but not u.c.s. ( (5) of Definition 4 is
violated). The situation depicted in Figure 1 may be recognized here. Player 1 supports 
the objection (1.1, {1}) against the proposal ((1, 2), {1, 2}) E K. At the same time he 
rejects this objection by the counter objection ((2, 1, 0), N). 
Note also that y1 < z1 = 1.1, if y is the payoff component of the proposal ((1, 2), {1, 2})
EK, so that, the conclusion of Proposition 5 can't be extended to the case of c.s. 
Remark: However, a weaker form of Proposition 5 can be stated for c.s. Let K, = 
{(yi, C1), . .. , (Ym, Cm)} a c.s. Define w E RN by wk = max{yfjk E Ci}. Then, it is easy
to verify that wk � zk for every k E N. 
Example 3. n = 2.v({l}) = v({2}) = [O,l],v({l,2}) = [0,2] x [0,2J. Obviously,
K, = { ( (1.5, 2), {1, 2})} is a s.c.s. but not u.c.s. But y = (1.5, 2) is not Pareto-optimal in
v( {1, 2} ), so that Proposition 4 fails if u.c.s. is replaced by c.s.
Example 4. n = 3.v( { i}) = (0, 1] for i = 1, 2, 3.v( { i, j}) = {(xi, xi) E R!lxi +xi � k}
if { i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3}.v(N) = {(x1 + x2 + x3) E R!lx1 + x2 + x3 � 3}.
Note that C(N,v) = fJ, but the game admits competitive solutions. For instance 
K, = {((2, 1), {1, 2} ), (1, {2} ), (1, {3})} is simultaneously, s.c.s. and u.c.s. It is easy to see
that K, is not minimal and K,' = { ((2, 1), {1, 2})} is also s.c.s. (u.c.s.). It is important to
note that K,' doesn't predict the payoff for all the players, since the coalition components
of the proposals in K,' don't cover N. Such situation can't appear if we deal with other
classical solution concepts (core, von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions, bargaining set, 
etc.). This example suggest us to introduce a stronger version of competitive solution. 
The formal definition follows: 
Definition 5. The competitive solution (s.c.s. or u.c.s.) K, = {(yi, Ci), i = 1, 2, . . .  , m}
is completP if UC, = ;v.
K in tlw prPvious example is rnmplt•f('. hut K' is not.
Iu tlw remaiuder of this st•ction WP will rf'strict our attention to complete uniform
competit i\'f' solutions (c.u.c.s.). According to (S) W<' can define an "ideal" payoff vector
!J E n'. wlios1· ('()lll[>Olll'Uts arl': ,1/ = .II�. for l'\'('ry ·, such that k E cj. Of course, from
defiuitio11 (..J) it follows that. y<·· E t·(C,) nprc,t·(.\') for every i = 1,2, ... , m. Finally,
from (G) It follows that if x E v(C) n prct·(.\'). for some C � N, then the inequality
x � ye is impossible. In summary, we are led to an alternative definition of a c.u.c.s.
Definition 4 '. A complete uniform competitive solution is a pair (y, C), y E RN, C � 2N 
such that 
(7) UcecC = N
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(8) ye E v(C) n prev(N), for every C E  C
(9) if x E v(C) n prev(N), for some C E  2N, then x'i:.ye
Now, let y be any vector of RN and denote by C(y) ={C E 2N I ye E v(C)nprev(N)}
Then, 
Proposition 6. If JC =  (y, C) is a c.u.c.s. then JC' = (y, C(y)) is a maximal c.u.c.s.
Usually, the game theoretical model is constrained to satisfy some additional prop­
erties. Most important results concerning both TU and NTU games are obtained for 
games having comprehensive characteristic functions. 
A game ( N, v) is comprehensive (or, its characteristic function is comprehensive) if, 
for each C E  2N if v(C) # fJ, then v(C) - Re+� v(C). 
Proposition 7. Suppose (N, v) comprehensive. Then, (y, C(y)) is (maximal) c.u.c.s.
if and only if U{ C I C E C(y)} = N and, for each C E C(y), ye is Pareto-optimal in 
v(C) nprcv(N). 
Proof: it simply follows from the remark that if x ;:::: ye for some coalition C and
x E v(C) n prcv(N), then ye E v(C) n prcv(N). 
Remarks. The definition of u.c s is derived from the concept of c.s. The internal stability 
(condition ( 5)) is strengthened to eliminate some contradictory aspects in the original 
definition. According to this new property, the external stability requirement (6) was 
also redefined. The class of objections considered is wider (compare (6) with (2)), but 
the response is somewhat weak<1nf'd. 
It its second formalization ( Ddiuit iou .I'). thf' concept of c. u.c.s. coincides with the
'"aspiration" of Bennett and Zanw ([::?] ) . 1•xn·pt thP f<'asibilit.y condition. Moreover, some
of existing theorems in this pap1•r rni1w11k with results due to Bennett ([1]) and Ben­
nett and Za.m<' ([3]). if the ass11111ptio11s rdat<'d to tlH1 feasibility condition are removed. 
HowPwr. our n•sults WPf<' obtairwd 1 11d1·1w11dP11tl!' using different methods of proof. 
3 Competitive Solutions of TU Games
The most general representation of a TU game in characteristic function form is (N, v): 
(10) v(C) = {x E Re I x(C) :5 V(C)} where Vis a real valued function defined on 2N
(called also characteristic function). 
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However, some other definitions of v are often employed by introducing some addi­
tional restrictions. We will refer in this section to models in which the set-valued mapping 
v satisfies boundedness conditions. Namely, 
(11) v(C) = {x ER� I x(C) ::; V(C)} or,
(12) v(C) = {x E Re I xk � V({k}),k E C, x(C)::; V(C)} 
Note that the third case may be reduced to the second by taking V( {k}) = 0 for all 
k EN , but it is not always possible to transfer the significant properties from one form 
to the other. 
Some other usual properties of V will be cited in the following. 
(13) Cc D =? V(C) ::; V(D) (Monotonicity ) 
(14) C n D = fJ =? V(C) + V(D) ::; V(C U D) (Superadditivity) 
(14') C n D = fJ =? V(C) + V(D) = V(C U D) (Additivity) 
(15) V(C) + V(D)::; V(C u D) + V(C n D), for every C, D E  2N (Convexity) 
It is easy to see that if V(fJ) = 0, then (15) =? (1 ) and if V � 0, then (14) =? (13).
Remarks. 
1. If the game (N, v) is defined as in (10), then,
(16) C � D =? v(C) � prcv(D).
Particularly. 1'( C) � prcd .\') for all C. As au import.ant consequence of this remark,
we can remove the feasibility co11ditio11 from the definition of competitive solutions, or 
of the con• . 
2. (16) remains valid in the cast• ( 11) iff Vis monotonic.
3. Thl' sanH' rnndusion still holds in t lw ca .... t· ( 1 :2) if V is superadditive (sufficient condi­
tion). I11d1•t•d. suppos<• C C  D awl IE r·(t). That is. IE Rc,xk � V({k}),k EC and
x(C)::; V(C). Extend x t.o a wctor i in nv taking ik = V({k}) , fork E D\C. Then,
x(D) = LkED\c V( {k}) + V(C) '.S V(D). Heuce, i E v(D) and xc = x, i.e., x E prcv(D).
Now we will point out soml' properties of competitive solutions for TU games. If no 
other assumption is made. we will consider (N, v) in the case of (10).
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Proposition 8. Let K be a c.s. (u.c.s.). Then, for each proposal (y, C) E K we have
y(C) = V(C). Particularly, y is Pareto-optimal in v(C). The same conclusions remain 
valid in the case (11) if Vis monotonic and in the case (12) if Vis superadditive. 
Proof: to prove first statement suppose that y(C) =J V(C). Of course, in this case, 
£ = V(C) - y(C) > 0. Define u E Re by uk = yk + c/ICI, k EC. Then, u(C) = V(C)
i.e., u E v(C) and u > y. Then,
(a) If K is c.s., there is (z, D) EK such that zCnD > ucnn, and, therefore zCnD > ycnn,
contradicting ( 1). 
(b) If K is u.c.s. , there are (z, D) EK and k E CnD such that zk > uk > yk contradicting
(5). 
For (11) and (12) the conclusions of the proposition follow from the remarks 2 and 3 
above. 
Proposition 9. Let be a u.c.s. If (y, C) E K and k E C, then yk 2:: V( { k} ). Conse­
quently, V(C) 2:: LkEC V( {k} ). The same conclusion holds in case (11) if Vis monotonic
and in case (12) if V is superadditive. 
Proof: it simply follows from Propositions 8 and 5 and from Remarks 2 and 3. 
The following lemma will be used in the proofs of Section 4 
Lemma 1. Let K be a c.u.c.s and a pair (x, D) where x(D) < V(D). Then, there exist
(y, C) E /( such that C n D-::/= fJ and k E C n D for which yk > xk. 
Proof: Let (u, E) EK, such that D n E f:. fJ. Suppose xDnE � uDnE. Define z E RD
by ::1 = I1 + :/IDI. t E D. wlH'rt': = V( D) - I(D) > 0 .. Obviously, z(D) = x(D) + £ =
V(D). tlH'r<'for<'. :; E t•(D). But :;W·F > In-F � 11nn1-: and then, by Definition 4, there
exist a proposal (y. C) E /( aud k E C n D such that yk > :;k > xk.
As a rn11s<'<1'H'l1Cl' of Proposit 1011 S awl Lt>111111a 1 WP can obtain an algebraically
charactPrizatiou of c.u.c.s. For co11v1·11 i1•1w1· w1• will llS<' Definition 4'. 
DP1101 ,. h�· . \It = { C E 2·' IV( C) 2: L:,. 1 V1 { 1})}. Of course. if V is superadditive then
.:VI = :! ' \ { ,fl} . 
Proposition 10. The pair (y.C)(y ER-") is a c.u.c.s. if and only if U{CIC EC} =
N, y(C') 2: V(C) for all C C .\'. C f:. fl and y(C) = V(C) for C E C. Moreover,
C �.\If. Tlw same conclusions holds in the casP (11) and (12) if monotonic, respectively, 
superadditivc. 
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Corollary. Let y ER. Suppose that U{ CIC E C(y)} = N. Then (y, C(y)) is a maximal 
c.u.c.s. if and only if y(C) = V(C) for all C E  C(y) and y(C) > V(C) for all C E  M\C(y). 
Remark. If IC is a complete c.s. and w is defined as in Section 3, then w(C) 2: V(C)
for all C E  2N. 
Now, let us recall some properties of the classical von Neumann-Morgenstern theory 
of TU games. Suppose that (N, v), (N, v') are two TU games having V, respectively, V' 
as the corresponding real-valued characteristic functions. 
Definition. The games (N, v), (N, v') are strategically equivalent if there exist the scalar 
a> 0 and the vector a E RN such that V'(C) = aV(C) + a(C), for every CC N.
Proposition 10'. Let (N, v), (N, v') be strategically equivalent. Then, IC =  {(yi, Ci) Ii = 
1, . . .  , m} is a c.s. (s.c.s. or u.c.s.) if and only if IC' = {(y�, Ci) Ii = 1, . . .  , m}, y� = Yi+af, 
is a c.s. (s.c.s., respectively u.c.s.) of the game (N, v'). The same conclusion holds for the 
game in the case (12). It still remains valid in case (11) if a = 0 (i.e. if V'(C) = aV(C)
for every C � N, a> 0). 
Proof: First, we note that y E v(C) ¢=> y' E v' (C), y' = ay + ac in the cases (10) and
(12), but the same relation holds in case (11) if and only if a = 0. Now, the proof of
Proposition is trivial since the mapping he : v(C) � v' (C), hc(y) = ay + ac preserves
the order relation between the payoffs of the players in C. 
4 Existence Theorems for TU Games
As a direct consequence of Proposition 2. if a TU game has a nonempty core it admits 
s.c.s. and u.c.s. TlH'll. any suffici1·11t rnndit io11s for t h1· existence of the core is sufficient 
condition for the• existencP of s.c.s. awl 11 c.s. Partirnlarly. balanced games and convex 
games admit a s . c.s. and 11.c.s \011· abo a simplt• situation when the existence of
co11qwt it iv1· solutions is g11ara11t 1·1·d 
Proposition 11. Ewry Tl' t wo J>"r:--1111 l,!.111w admit s a s.c.s. and u.c.s. 
!\ow. Wt' will n•strirt our at t 1·11t 1t111 111 111 s \\·,. will prow the existence of a c.u.c.s.
for any TU game satisfying ( 10) and w1· will d"d1w1• :-;ufficient conditions in the other
two cases. The method of proof is inspin·d by tlw PPIPg paper [6] and is, essentially, the 
reduced-game method. 
Theorem 1. For every Tl'. ganH' wit h 1 · d1•fi11Pd by ( 10) there exists a c. u.c.s.
Proof: By induction on n = INI. For n = 1 the truth of the theorem is obvious;
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(V(l ), {1}) is a c.u.c.s. Suppose the theorem valid for every game having at most n - 1 
players and let be (N, v), INI = n. 
Denote by M = N\{n} and define the reduced game (M, VM) by its real-valued 
characteristic function V M; 
VM(C) = max{V(C), V(C U {n}) - zn}, C � M
where zn = V( {n} ). 
Since IMI = n - 1, the game (M, VM) has a c.u.c.s., say ICM =  {(j/i, Ci) Ii = 1, ... m }.
Denote by 
(16) 
(1 Z) 
( 18) 
{ Yi if C = CiYi = (ij., z11} if c: = Ci U { n}
IC = {(y,. c;)li = 1,. .. , m} 
K 
. = { K. if t lH'n· Pxist s i such that c; 3 n·' A.. u { ( .: 11• { 11} ) } . ot hPrwise. 
(for convenience . we will write (Ym+l•c;n+ll for (.:", {n})). 
We are ready to prove that IC,.,. is a c.u.c.s . of (N, v ) . Of course, UCI = N, Yi E v(CI)
for all i and y, E prc;v(.'\') (sC'e Remark 1). To verify (5) suppose (yi,CI),(yj,Cj) E ICN
and y� > v; for some k E c; n c;. We claim that k #- n. Indeed, if Ci = Ci then
n a C' n C' and if n E C' n C'. then y" = y" = zn'jl: ' J ' J' ' J • 
1 1  
Then the initial assumption implies that yf > yj for some k E Ci n Ci, contradicting
the properties of KM. 
Let us verify (6) .  Let Cc N, u E v(C) and suppose that ucnq 2 ycnq for some i.
We analyze three possibilities: 
(i) if n r/. C, then u E vM(C) (and u E prcvM(M)) and ucnc; 2 ycnci. Since KM is a
u.c.s. of (M,vM) then there exist j:::; m and k E CnCj such that yj > uk. I.e., yj > uk 
for some k E C n Cj. 
(ii) If C = { n} then un :::; zn and the initial assumption fails. 
(iii) Suppose that C = Q U {n} where fJ =/:- Q � M. Again there are three cases: 
a) un < zn. Then yj > un for every j for which n E Cj.
b) un > zn. Then, u(Q) = u(C) - un < V(C) - zn:::; VM(Q). Hence, uQ E vM(Q).
From Lemma 1, there exist j and k E Q n Ci such that yj > uk. That is, yj > uk for
some k E C n Ci. 
. 
c) un = zn. Of course, if n E c: then yf = zn. Therefore, the initial assumption
implies that uQnC; 2 yQnC;. Since u( Q) :::; V( Q U { n}) - zn :::; VM( Q) it follows that
UQ E VM(Q). But K M is a c.u.c.s. of (111, VAf ) so that there exist j and k E Q n cj such
that yj > uk, or, equivalently, yj > uk for k E C n Cj.
Corollary 1. If V is convex and V( /)) = 0. then the game (N, v) has a c.u.c.s. of the
form K = {(y, N)}. K is a s.c.s. too. 
Proof: F irstly. note that the proof of Theorem 1 is constructive. A c.u.c.s. may be 
obt.ainC'd in 11 st.Pps. C'ach step Pxtmdiug a.11 exist iug c.u.c.s. to a solution for a game
having onP morC' player. This extcusion may be made on two ways: by adding a new 
proposal to the Pxisting sol 11 ti on or kP«'ping t lw same number of proposals. In the last
case. acrnrdiug to (IG) and (17). a 1ww pla�·pr is a.dckd to some coalition-components of
the proposals iu the pr<•v ious solut ion. Tlw pr<><'f'SS st.arts at the step 1 with the solution
of a orw JH•rso11 gamt•. Of co11rs1•. this s1Jl11t ltJll ha, .... onP proposal. At the second step
this sol11tio11 would lw PXl<'llU<'d to a mw-pruptJsal sol ution too, if (16) pick on the second
altcrnat iv1·. It is l'asy to SC<' that this happt•us if t lH' corresponding characteristic function
is sup<•radditivC'. In summary. if at. each st.Pp. the real-valued characteristic function of
the current game is superadditive, then the final solution will consist of a single proposal. 
The complC'tencss implies that the corresponding coalition is N. 
Now, it is sufficient to prove that i f  V satisfies the assumptions of the corollary, then 
VM is also convex. Obviously, since V( ))) = 0, the convexity implies the superadditivity
(we can always VM(,l)) = 0, by definition).
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Let C, D c M. We are going to prove that VM(C)+ VM(D):::; VM(CUD)+ VM(CnD). 
Since it is obviously verified if one of the two coalitions is fJ or M, we can consider 
both C and D different of fJ and lvl. Since V is superadditive, if n E C if follows that
V(C)+V({n}):::; V(CU{n}). Hence, VM(C) = V(CU{n})-zn. Then, VM(C)+VM(D) = 
V( C U  { n}) + V(D U { n}) - 2zn. Since Vis convex, we obtain finally, VM( C) + VM(D) :::; 
V(C U D U  {n}) + V((C n D) U {n}) - 2vn = VM(C U D). 
Corollary 2. (Shapley, [7]) Suppose Vis convex and V(fJ) = 0. Then C(N, v) ::/:- fJ.
Proof: It simply follows from the previous Corollary and Proposition 3. 
Corollary 3. Suppose Vis subadditive (i.e. V(C U D) :S V(C) + V(D) if C n D = fJ).
Then Ko = {(u�, {k})Jk E N} where u0 = (V({l}), V({2}), ... , V({n})) is a c.u.c.s. 
Moreover, Ko is a complete s.c.s. too. 
Proof: The Proof of Theorem 1 remains still valid if (16) is replaced by 
(16') 
Then, if Vis subadditive, c; =Ci for i = 1, ... , m and, consequently, KN is obtained
from KM by adding a new proposal. Note that the coalition of this proposal is a singleton. 
If the above mentioned situation appears to each step, then the constructive process 
discussed in the proof of Corollary 1 end by K0. All what we must do is to prove that 
VM is subadditive if V is. Obviously. this is true because if Vis subadditive, then VM is 
the restriction of V to the su bs<'t s of .\I. 
Remark 1. If Vis additive. tlH'll tlw rn11clusio11s of Corollary 1 and Corollary 3 hold.
But it is <'<l..\V to S('f' that. in this r;L"t" for a11v St'I C of coalitions which cover N, the pair
( u0, C) is a c.u.c.s. (see Detinitio11 ·-I' a11d Ex;u11pl1> I).
Remark 2. As it w;L<; show11. if Ci.\'. 1) -i /l. 1 1 1 1•11 there exist (strong) competitive
solutions oft h<' form { ( u .. \·)} wit It 11 E ( 't .\". 1 ) . :\lso. if thP game is subadditive, it has
c.c.s. But we cau prov<' that a TC ga11w h<L" not c.c.s., except these above mentioned
situations. More precisely. WP will prov<' t lw following statement:
if C(X. v) = fJ and Vis not subadditiv<'. then the game (N, v) has no c.c.s.
Proof: Let the game (N, v) and suppose that K ={( ye, C)JC EC} is a c.c.s. Denote
by £ = { kJ { k} E C} and let w be the corresponding "ideal payoff vector" (see remark of
Example 2). Three cases will be discussed; 
13 
(a) fJ =/:- £ =/:- N. 
Pick an k E £ and m<¢£. Define x E RN by:
for an arbitrary positive E. 
wt + E, if t =I- m
V(N) - Lt=fm xt, if t = m
Of course, x E v(N) , i.e., (x, N) is a proposal. Obviously, xk > yrk} but there are no
CE C such that yg > xc. 
(b) C = fJ. Pick an k E N such that there exists C E C, C�k. (This is possible if 
C =f. {N }. To the contrary, C(N, v) =I- fJ). Define x E RN by:
for an arbitrary positive E. 
Again, (x, N) is a proposal and xc > yg. Moreover, if C' EC, then yg'-;f-xc'.
(c) £ = N. This means that (V{k}), {k}) E IC for every k. If Vis not subadditive, 
then there exists C E 2N such that V( C') > LkEC V( { k}), and it is easy to find x E V( C) 
such that xk > V( { k}) for all k E C. At the same time, for each C E C it is necessary
that u� = V( { k}) for every k E C. So, again the properties of the c.s. are contradicted.
Now. we will show how w<' mu (•x t <•nd ThPorem 1 to cover the TU game satisfying
( 11) or ( 12 ) . As we have sPeu iu St ·ct io11 3. w1• W<'n' constrained to impose some additional
assumptions to V iu order to sat isfy t lit' ft'<L"ibility condition required by the definitions
of ro111JH't it iw solut ions. 
Theorem 2. Suppos<• V : 2' --+ U. 111011ot o11ic aud V defined by (11). Then the
ganH' ( .\'.,. ) ha .. " a c.11.c.s .
Proof: First ly. uott• that if  v b lllOllOt OlllL t lwn v.\f is too. Consequently, if c c D
then v(C) C prcv(D} and this stat t>111<•11t holds also for the reduced game. In other 
words. the fca.i;ibility condition is satisfil'd at every step in the proof of Theorem 1. It is 
easy to see uow that the proof of Thcor<'lll 2 follows the same way as for Theorem 1. 
Remark. Since V is nonnegative, v( C) =f 1J for every C E 2N. If we remove this 
assumption, then the proof of Theorem 2 could fail, because it is possible that v ( C) = fJ
for some C. 
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However, Theorem 2 remains true even if Vis not necessarily positive. The conclusion 
will follow from the main result of the next section. 
Theorem 2'. Suppose V : 2N -+ R, monotonic and V(N) 2 0. If v is defined by 
(11), then the game (N, V) has a c.u.c.s.
Theorem 3. Suppose V superadditive and v defined by (12). Then the game (N, v) 
has a c. u.c.s. 
Proof: (N, v) is strategically equivalent to the game (N, v') , whose corresponding
real-valued characteristic function is 
V'(C) = V(C) -uo (C ) , C C N,(uo = (V({k }) kEN))
Obviously, v'(C) = {x E R�lx(C) � V'(C)}.
Since Vis superadditive, V' is monotonic and nonnegative. Indeed, if CC D, then, 
V'(C) -V'(D) . V(C) -V(D) + u0(D\C) � V(C) + V(D\C) -V(D) � O
Consequently, by Theorem 2, (N, v') has a c.u.c.s. The conclusion of Theorem 3 follows
now from Proposition 10. 
Remark. The result established in Theorem 2 is contained in Theorem 3.1. of 
Bennett ([1]). The monotonicity assumed here is needed only for the effectiveness re­
quirement. 
5 Existence Theorems for NTU Games
Evcrywh<>r<' i11 this sPctiou. a ga11w is d1•fi1lf'd hy at rip I<' (;\',tr, v ) , where W � 2N\ {fl} W f:.
fJ. is t lw s1•t of winning c·oalit irn1� a11d 1 iL"'"'1i.:.11� t 11 Pach C E 2 ·"· a subset of R� which is
llOlll'lll pl�· i ff c E ""
ThPorPm 4. LPt t h1• ga11w I.\". 11 ·. 1 I :-at 1:-fy t lw' followiug assumptions
(1 !J) C E I\'. C C C' => C' E I\' 
(20) l'(C) is compact ( nonvoid) in n�· for PVcry c E H'
(�l) r E r(C). 0 � y � r => !J E l'(C) (Comprchcnsivity) 
(22) CE H', C C  D => v(C) C prcv(D) (Weak monotonicity) 
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( 23) C E 2N, k ¢ C, x E v ( C U { k}) and ( xe, a) E v ( C U { k}) for some 0 :S a < xk ::
there exists y E v( C U { k}) such that ye > xe, yk = a. 
Then, the game (N, v) has a c.u.c.s. 
Remark. Under assumption (21), the condition (23) may be restated: ((23') C E 
2N, k¢C, x E v(C U {k}), O :Sa < xk:::} there exists y E v(C U {k}) such that ye> 
xe, yk =a. 
Proof of the Theorem: We will prove it into two steps. Firstly, consider a particular 
case. 
Case 1. 
By induction on n = INI. Of course, for n = 1 the theorem holds. ( v( {1}) is 
nonempty, compact, so IC =  {(z, {1})} is a c.u.c.s., where z = max{x E v({l})}). 
Suppose the theorem is also true for every game satisfying (19')-(23) with at most n - 1 
players (n 2:: 2). Now consider a game having n players. Denote by zn = max{xlx E
v({n})} and M = N\{n}. Define: 
C { fJifC=fJ vM( ) = v(C) U {x E R�l(x.xn) E l'(C U {n} )} for some xn;::: zn, if fJ =/:-CC M
Of course, v M is the characteristic function of an n - 1 person game ( M, W M, v M) for
which H'M= {Cc .MlvM(C) :f,()} = 2.\f\{,()}. This game also satisfies the assumption· 
of case 1. Since (19). (l!J') and (20) a.n• trivial. IPt us V('rify (21), (22) and (23).
Let :r E t'M(C) and y E R�'. !I � I If I E 1·(C). then y E v(C) and therefore,
y E i·.\f(C). If. for som<• r" � :".(I.I"l E r·(('i..J {11}). then. taking yn = zn it follows
that (y.y") E t•(CU {11}) and lw11n" '' t.: '"IC) Co11:->t•q11<•ntly, (21) is also satisfied by
V,\f · 
S11ppost> (' C D C .\/ a11d I ( r "1 CI If .r E I'( C). then x E prcv(D) and,
therefore. I E  ]Jrct',\t(D). If. fur so11w r" :'.: .:".(r.r") E v(CU {n}), then (x,xn) E
prcu{ri) t'( Du { n}). Then. thN<' l'Xists !I E 1·( Du { 11}) such that ye = x and yn = xn ;::: zn.
Hence . y0 E vM(D) and ye = :r. Cons<•quently. :r E prcvM(D).
Finally. let us verify (23). Tak<· QC .\/.k E M\Q, x E v(C) (C = Q U {k}) and
0 :S a < xk. There are two possibilities:
(i) if x E v(C), then there exists y E v(C) with yQ > xQ,yk = a, i.e.,
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(ii) if (x, xn) E v(CU lnl) for some xn � zn, then we can find y E v(CU{n}) such that 
yQU{n} > xQu{n}, yk = a. Particularly, since yn > xn � zn it follows that ye E VM( C).
Since yQ > xQ the proof is complete. 
Now, since (M, W M, vM) has n-1 players, it has a c.u.c.s., say KM: 
Denote by 
JC _ { JC, if c: 3 n for some i N - KU(Ym+i.C:ri+1) otherwise
W(' will prove that JC,\' is a C'.11.C.S of (.\'.Jr.!').
Of course . uc: = N since uC, = .\/. Also. y, E t'( c;). Note also that the effectiveness
of y, (i.e .. y, E prc,d.\')) is a dir<'ct 1·011s<'q111•11n• of (22). It is easy to verify (5) too (see
Theorm1 1 ). Let us verify (6). or. <'q11ivalc·ntly. (9). Denote by y the n vector whose
components are yk = y�, whenever k E c; and by fj the n -1 vector whose components
are defined by ·tl = tl whenever k E C,. 
Suppose that xc 2:: ye for an :r E v(C) n prcv(N). Then:
(i) If n ¢ C, it follows that x E vM(C), xc �ye, which is impossible by the definition 
of KM. 
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(ii) If C = { n}, then x � zn = yn, so the initial assumption fails.
(iii) If C = Q U {n}, fJ#Q CM, we will examine two possibilities. 
a) xn = zn, then, xQ E VM(Q), xQ � f}Q contradicting (9) of /(M·
b) xn > zn. Then, by (23), there exists u E v(C) such that uQ > xQ, un = zn. Hence,
uQ E vM(Q), uQ > xQ � f}Q and again we contradict the properties of /(M· 
Case 2. 
Now we consider the general case, when W is not necessarily 2N\{fJ}. 
Pick T E  W such that ITI = min{ICllC E W }. Take z E Rr, Pareto-optimal in v(T) 
and denote by M = N\T. Define for each CC M, 
{
/J if C=fJ vM(C) =
. Uscr{x E R�l(x, z8) E v(C U S)} if fJ #CC M 
Of course, WM = {C E MlvM(C) #/)} = 2M\{ /)}. Indeed, by (19), C UT E W
and by (22) zT = z E v(T) � prrv(C UT), so that, {x E R�l(x, zT) E v(C UT)} -::j:.!J. 
Moreover, the triple (M, WM, VM) satisfies the assumptions of the theorem. Since the 
proof is the same as in case 1 we will not repeat it. 
Let J(M = {(iJi,Ci)li = 1, . . . , m } a c.u.c.s. of (.M, WM,vM). Of course, Yi E vM(Ci),
that is, there exists Si C �such that Yi= (ih, z8i) E v(Ci U Si)· Denote by CI= Ci U Si
and put/(= {((y1,z8i), CDli = l, .. . ,m} and
K . = { A.:. if u S, 
= T
" /( U { ( .: . T)}. otherwise
(for convenience we will denote (Ym+ I• c:.i.1) for ( .:, T))
/(, is a <'.U.r.s. of (1\', W. i•). 
Obviously. y1 E v(C;) for all i and. by (22). y1 E prc1v(N). To verify (5) we proceed
I 
as in case 1. Let us verify (9). Suppose C E lr, x E v(C) n prcv(N) and x � ye
( y  = (yk)kES where yk = y� if k E C1 for some i ::; m, and yk = zk if k ET).
Of course. C = T or C n M '#/J.
If C = T, then x E v(T), x � z, which is impossible since z is Pareto-optimal in v(T). 
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Then assume C = Q US, where fJ =I= Q C M, SC T. We have either xQ � fiQ or 
xs � zs (fl is the restriction of y to M).
(i) Suppose xQ � yQ. Clearly, by (21), (xQ, zs) E v(Q US). Then, xQ E VM(Q) and 
the previous inequality contradicts the properties of fl. 
(ii) Suppose xs � z8• Pick a k ES such that xk > zk. Since (yQ, ss) E v(Q U S) it
follows by (23), that there exists some u E v(QUS) such that uk = zk, uQ > yQ, uS\{k} > 
xs\{k}. Again by (21), (uQ, zs) E v(Q U S). Then uQ E vM(Q). Since uQ > gQ, we
contradict the definition of ICM. 
Corollary. Theorem 2'. 
Proof: Of course, if V is monotonic and V(N) 2: 0, then, W = {CJv(C)=/=/)} is
not empty and is closed under the set-inclusion relation (i.e. satisfies (19)). All other 
assumptions of Theorem 4 are trivially verified by the TU game defined by (11).
Remark. The assumptions of theorem 4 are weaker than the usual conditions which 
imply the existence of the core. It is easy to see that the weak monotonicity used here 
is a weaker condition than convexity or superadditivity. However, (23) may be violated 
by NTU games satisfying other usual conditions. The following example shows that the 
existence of u.c.s. can't be guaranteed if (23) is removed. 
Example 5. n = 3. v({i}) = [O, 1],i = 1,2,3;v({l,2}) = [0,1.5] x [0,2];v({l,3}) = 
[O, 2] x [O, 1.5]; v( {2, 3}) = [O, 1.5] x [O, 2]; v( {1, 2, 3}) = {(x1, x2, x3) E Rt Jx1 + x2 + x3 � 
3.5}. 
Note that this game does not have any competitive solution either. 
Remark. The assumption (21) may h<• rt>moved in Theorem 1 if we will impose (23) for
the comprt'l1ensive closure of'" l11dP<•d. if w1• ddiue. 
f·(C') = { fl, if r�L)O{y E R�I there t•x1st:- r E r·(C) such that y � x} otherwise,
( tlw romprPlwusivP clos11n· of r ( C 1 l 
we <H<' able to prove the followiug n·sult:-.. 
Proposition 12. If IC = { (y,, C, )Ii = 1. . . . . 111} 1s a c.u.c.s. of (N, W), then it is a
c.u.c.s .  of (.\', n·, v) too. 
Proof: It is sufficient to verify that y, E v(C i). In the contrary, there exists x E
v(Ci) C v(Ci), y � x. But, then, there exists j and k E Ci n Cj such that yj > xk � yf, 
which is impossible since IC is u.c.s. of (N, W, v). 
19 
Proposition 13. If v satisfies (20) and (22), then v also satisfies them. Moreover, v is 
comprehensive. 
Proof: Since v( C) is obviously bounded, it is sufficient to prove that it is closed. Let 
Yk-+ y, Yk E v(C). Then, there exist xk E v(C), Yk ;£ Xk, for all k, Since v(C) is compact
we may assume that xk -+ x E v(C) (otherwise a subsequence will be considered).
Clearly, y :::= x, i.e., y E v(C). To verify (22), let y E v(C) and Cc D. There is x E v(C) 
such that y ;£ x. Also, there is a z E v(D) with x = z0. Then, (y, zD\C) < z. Hence,
(y, zD\C) E v(D) and y E pr0v(D). Now, we can restate the theorem.
Theorem 1'. Suppose (N, W, v) satisfy (19), (20), (22), and 
(23') CE 2N,ktj.C,x E v(C U {k}),O::::; a< xk there exists y E v(C U {k}) such that
ye > xe, yk = a.
Then, the game (N, W, v) admits a c.u.c.s. 
Remark. Theorem 1' actually covers different situation. For instance, see Figure 2. 
Figure 2 
v(C) 
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